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Abstract: What lies behind Aristotle’s declarations that an attribute 
or feature that is demonstrated to belong to a scientific subject is 
proper to that subject?  The answer is found in APo. 2.8-10, if we 
understand these chapters as bearing not only on Aristotle theory 
of definition but also as clarifying the logical structure of 
demonstration in general.  If we identify the basic subjects with 
what has no different cause, and demonstrable attributes (the kath’ 
hauta sumbebēkota) with what do have ‘a different cause’, the 
definitions of demonstrable attributes necessarily have the minor 
terms of the appropriate demonstrations in their definitions, for 
which reason the subjects and demonstrable attributes are 
coextensive.   
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I 
 
Distinctions between what is basic and what is derivative 
run through Aristotelian metaphysics and epistemology.  
Aristotle’s ontological analyses rest on the distinction 
between substances and the nonsubstantial beings 
dependent on them.  This distinction is mirrored by (and 
partially corresponds to) 1  an epistemological distinction 
between two different kinds of beings studied by the 
sciences: those kinds that constitute the subject matter of the 
sciences and the derivative features of those kinds, which are 
accounted for on their basis.  Just as, from the point of view 
of ontology, substances are ultimate substrates, and 
nonsubstances ontologically depend on substances, so, 
epistemologically, certain kinds are taken to be basic by the 
science that studies them, and scientific understanding of all 
other beings considered by that science is derived from what 
the science presumes about those kinds. 
APo. 1 sets out the bsics of Aristotle’s theory of 
demonstration, the form in which scientific explanations can 
ideally be cast.  Demonstrations are syllogisms, of which the 
minor term is the subject kind under consideration, and of 
which the major term is the feature belonging to the subject 
that is being explained.  Demonstrations presuppose that 
certain definitional features belong to the subject kinds.  
Such features constitute what the subjects of the science are; 
they are to be distinguished from demonstrated features.   
This much is clear enough.  But much of the theory of 
explanation that Aristotle works through in the Posterior 
Analytics is notoriously complex and obscure.  In part this is 
                                                 
1 The correspondence is partial because, although all substantial 
kinds are basic from the point of view of the sciences studying 
them, some sciences (like the mathematical ones) consider 
nonsubstantial kinds as basic, disregarding their inherence in more 
basic entities.  On this see Goldin (1996, pp. 73-7). 
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because Aristotle uses a number of phrases (kath’ hauto, 
atomos, katholou, heteros aitios, hupokeimenon) in a technical 
manner, without always clearly distinguishing what sense of 
a term is being used in a particular passage.  Add to this the 
terse nature of the argumentation, and it is no surprise that 
for millennia particular passages have admitted of many 
interpretations.  Lingering problems in interpreting the 
Posterior Analytics have resulted.  Although Aristotle’s account 
is honored as having hit on the notion that explanation 
involves a kind of inference from the essences of real kinds, 
it is often considered confused and incoherent in parts, and 
as containing significant gaps in working through how these 
explanations are supposed to work. 
Aristotle’s account can be acquitted of many such charges 
if we appreciate that in the Posterior Analytics the terminology 
by which he distinguishes scientific subjects and 
demonstrated attributes is more fluid than usual.  The 
distinction between basic kinds and demonstrated features is 
referred to in a number of ways, since different contexts 
require focusing on different aspects of the distinction.    The 
following distinctions made by Aristotle, I shall argue, are 
either equivalent or are closely related, made in different 
contexts in order to solve different problems.  
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A Those items whose 
existence is 
presupposed by 
the sciences 
Those items whose 
existence is 
demonstrated by 
the sciences 
B Subjects of the 
sciences, Primary 
items, the things 
whose scientific 
definitions are 
presupposed by 
demonstration, 
minor terms of 
demonstrations 
Derivative 
attributes 
explained by the 
sciences (the kath’ 
hauta sumbebēkota) 
or pathē 
(attributes), the 
things whose 
scientific 
definitions are not 
presupposed by 
demonstration, 
major terms of 
demonstrations 
C What has no cause 
different from 
itself 
What has a cause 
different from 
itself (93a5-6, 
93b19, 2.9 93b21-
28) 
D Atoms, simple 
subjects 
Complexes, 
derivative subjects 
E Predicates that are 
kath’ hauta in the 
sense indicated at 
1.4 73a34-7 
Predicates that are 
kath’ hauta in the 
sense indicated at 
1.4 73a37-b3 
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The relationships among these distinctions have not 
wholly escaped commentators but they have not been 
thoroughly worked through in a way that sheds light on 
otherwise obscure aspects of Aristotle’s theory of 
demonstration.  The present paper focuses on one such 
issue: what lies behind Aristotle’s declarations that an 
attribute or feature that is demonstrated to belong to a 
scientific subject is proper to that subject?  The answer is 
found in APo. 2.8-10, if we understand these chapters as 
bearing not only on Aristotle theory of definition but also as 
clarifying the logical structure of demonstration in general.  
If we identify the basic subjects with things that have no 
different cause, and demonstrable attributes (the kath’ hauta 
sumbebēkota) with those that do have ‘a different cause,’ the 
definitions of the demonstrable attributes necessarily have 
the minor terms of the appropriate demonstrations in their 
definitions, for which reason the subjects and demonstrable 
attributes are coextensive.  In this paper I show how and why 
this is so. 
 
 
II 
 
Book 1 tells us that each of the sciences posits certain 
basic kinds as objects of study.  “For every demonstrative 
science concerns three things, first, those for which it posits 
the being (this is the kind of which it studies the kath’ hauta 
attributes). . .” (APo. 1.10 76b11-13).2  Each science posits as 
principles of explanation the definitions of the basic kinds 
that it studies.  “In the case of some things one must already 
grasp that they are; in the case of others, one must know 
what that which is referred to (to legomenon) is, and in the case 
                                                 
2 Here and elsewhere, translations are my own. 
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of some things, both . . . In the case of triangle, one must 
know that [the term] signifies this and in the case of the 
monad one must know both, what [it is that] is signified and 
that there is [such a thing] (1.1 71a12-6).3  (This is distinction 
A.)  Aristotle identifies this distinction with that between 
those items of which the existence is presupposed by the 
sciences, the primary items, and the derivative items of which 
it is not: “In the case of the primary items and the things 
[derivative] from them, what it signifies is assumed, but that 
they are is assumed for the principles and is proven for the 
others.  For example, what monad and straight and triangle 
are is assumed, but that they are is assumed for the monad 
and magnitude, but is proven for the others” (I.10 76a32-6).4  
The facts that there are such things, and that they have 
certain essences, are not themselves objects of explanation 
and accordingly cannot be demonstrative conclusions.  The 
determinations of which basic kinds are actually to be found 
in the world (expressed in what Aristotle calls hypotheses) 
and the expression of their explanatorily basic features (in 
                                                 
3 Aristotle here and elsewhere uses the phrase ti sēmainei both to 
refer to one’s pretheoretical grasp of the use of a term and a basic 
essence of the reference of a term.  There is scholarly consensus 
that the former is what is presupposed for a term like ‘triangle’ and 
the latter for a term like ‘monad’. 
4 As in 1.1 71a12-6, for basic subjects, ‘what it signifies’ (ti sēmainei) 
refers to a scientific definition expressing a basic essence; in the 
case of other things, it refers to the a pretheoretical grasp of the 
meaning of a term, the sort of account from which the kind of 
inquiry described in 2.8 begins (2.8 93a21-4).  See Bronstein (2016, 
p. 185) on the “weak” kind of preliminary knowledge presupposed 
here.   
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what Aristotle calls definitions)5 are not absolute starting 
points of inquiry, for they are the results of empirical 
investigation, dialectical discussion, and a process of seeing 
which purported explanations hold water and which do not.  
Nonetheless, in the context of demonstration, they are 
presented as basic.6  On the basis of the definitions of the 
primary things one demonstrates that the derivative entities 
are predicated of them, and in that way demonstrates their 
existence.7  These derivative entities are accordingly to be 
understood as demonstrable attributes, which Aristotle 
elsewhere calls the kath’ hauta sumbebēkota or the pathē kath’ 
hauta.8    
                                                 
5  1.2.72a18-21.  For this (standard) understanding of the 
distinction between definitions and hypotheses (in the sense 
employed here) see Ross (1949, p. 508) and Landor (1981). 
6 I agree with Charles (2010, p. 303) that Aristotle does not take 
demonstrations to consist in the unpacking of what is analytically 
contained in a priori truths, but do not agree that an interpretation 
such as mine derives from such an assumption.  Aristotle is 
discussing the structure of demonstrations based on first 
principles, and it is puzzles concerning their logical structure that 
motivates Aristotle’s account, as I understand it.  Epistemological 
issues concerning how one arrives at those first principles are 
another matter altogether. 
7 On this see Goldin (1996, pp. 48-51) and McKirahan (1992, pp. 
188-97).  McKirahan writes that there is “a surprisingly close fit 
between existence proofs and subject-attribute demonstrations.”  
As I shall show in this paper, that is because they are the same. 
8 See Meta. Δ 30 1025a30-2: “The term ‘accident’ (sumbebēkos) is 
used in another way, in regard to all of those things that belong to 
each in itself (kath’ hauto) but not in the essence, for example, 
having [the interior angles equal to] two right angles, in relation to 
triangle.”  (Henceforth I will abbreviate ‘having the interior angles 
equal to two right angles’ as 2RA.)  See also 1.7 75b1, where the 
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Book 1 suggests that there are two kinds of definitions: 
scientific ones, which are basic to explanation and are 
accordingly indemonstrable, and pretheoretical accounts of 
the signification of terms.  Book 2 however argues that there 
is a way, or a sense, in which definitions can be both 
demonstrable (and are accordingly not basic) yet express 
essences grasped by science.  The key to the apparent 
discrepancy lies in a proper understanding of Distinctions A 
and B and showing how implicit appeal is made to them in 
Book 2. 
The account of how there can be a kind of 
‘demonstration of the definition,’ is the culmination of a long 
continuous stretch of argumentation which begins by 
discussing the kinds of inquiry for which a demonstration 
provides the answers.  Aristotle asserts that the answer to a 
‘why is it’ question is the same as the answer to a ‘what is it’ 
question, and supports this by means of examples (APo. 2.2 
90a14-23).  The answer to the question ‘why is the moon 
eclipsed?’ is found in the answer to the question ‘what is an 
eclipse?’: a privation of light from the moon on account of 
the interposition of the earth.  The two answers differ only 
                                                 
explicative kai identifies them with the pathē kath’ hauta.  On the 
identification of derivative entities with the kath’ hauta sumbebēkota 
see Goldin (2004).  Granger (1981, p. 123, n. 2) denies that the 
kath’ hauta sumbebēkota are demonstrable attributes but he frankly 
confesses that he is at a loss in how to account for Aristotle’s 
reference to 2RA as kath’ hauto sumbebēkos.  In contrast, the 
scholarly consensus is that this is key evidence in reconstructing 
Aristotle’s account of the logic of demonstration and that one 
ought not worry much about Aristotle’s remark at APo. 1.4 73b16-
24 (central to Granger’s account) which suggests that those kath’ 
hauta attributes that are not definitional always come in pairs, such 
that it is necessary that one or the other belong to their subject 
term. 
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in their linguistic formulation. 9   A second example that 
Aristotle gives is that of the definition of a concord (what 
we, though not the Greeks, would call a ‘harmony’) and the 
answer to the question “why is there a concord?”: A concord 
is a numerical ratio between high and low; two notes form a 
concord because there is numerical ratio between them.  
Accordingly, demonstrations, which are explanatory insofar 
as their premises reveal the cause of their conclusion, can 
thereby serve as expressions of the ‘what is it’.  Definitions 
can, in a sense, be demonstrated.   
Aristotle’s account of when and how this is so is not clear 
and even the main lines of his account have always been the 
occasion for significant controversy.  Crucial is how we 
interpret Aristotle’s assertion that this sort of demonstration 
is possible only when “there is a different cause” (2.8 93a3-
7, 93b19, 2.9 93b21, 25-8).  Some commentators have read 
Aristotle here as talking about kinds of demonstrations 
and/or definitions different from those discussed in Book 1, 
while some take him to be talking about different kinds of 
definienda.  Many of those who belong to the first group of 
exegetes take the antecedent of “what has a different cause” 
at 2.8 93a5-6, 93b19, and 2.9 93b21-28 to be not a kind of 
entity, but a kind of definition which is made intelligible on 
the basis of an alternative, less provisional definition of the 
same thing.  According to this line of interpretation, this 
more adequate, scientific demonstration is different from the 
less adequate, more provisional definition, insofar as it has 
                                                 
9 This is a point that Aristotle explicitly makes at 2.10 94a1-2, in 
which a definition like “an eclipse is a blocking of light from the 
moon on account of the interposition of the earth” is said to 
“differ from demonstration in the arrangement [of its terms]”; see 
also 94a12-3. 
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different semantic content, and is the cause (or explanation) 
of the latter insofar as it renders it intelligible.10   
I have argued that the alternative strategy, which takes 
Aristotle to be distinguishing between kinds of being, not 
kinds of definitions, has its origin in the lost commentary of 
Alexander of Aphrodisias. 11   It was advocated by Ross 
(1949), and then lost a bit of favor in the following decades.  
Nonetheless it has recently gained a number of adherents, 
myself among them.12 Those of us who take this line agree 
                                                 
10 For example “extinction of fire in the clouds” (2.8 93b8-9) is a 
different, more scientific definition of thunder than is “a certain 
noise” which at 2.8 93a21-3 is said to be what one grasps if one 
knows that there is thunder accidentally, by virtue of being in touch 
with “something of the thing itself” (ekhontes to autou tou pragmatos).  
This account makes its first appearance in the commentary on APo. 
2 attributed to Philoponus, found in Wallies (1909, pp. 334-440) 
and translated in Goldin (2009).  See Goldin (1996, pp. 102-7), 
Goldin (2010, pp. 176-82).  A version of it can be found in 
Mansion (1976), pp. 183-97.  On this account, even a substance or 
metaphysical simple could be the kind of thing for which a 
definition can be demonstrated.  Some textual support for that 
might be found in two of the examples to which Aristotle appeals 
in his discussion of how definitions can in a sense be 
demonstrated: the definitions of human and soul (2.8 93a24).  The 
partial definitions of these (“a kind of animal,” and “a self-mover”) 
that Aristotle gives are understood as partial definitions, of which 
the complements are “different causes.”  See Zuppolini (2016, 202-
3).  But Aristotle here can be understood as giving examples of 
what he has in mind by partial definitions that express “something 
of the thing itself”; they need not also be taken as examples of 
things whose definitions can in a sense be demonstrated.   
11 Goldin (2010, 157-76). 
12 Goldin (1996), Harari (2004, pp. 143-4), Deslauriers (2007, pp. 
45-65), Bronstein (2016, pp. 132-7).   A variation is found in 
McKirahan (1994, pp. 200-1), where aition, rendered as “grounds”, 
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that sorts of entities for which demonstrations cannot reveal 
definitions in the manner described in 2.8, which Aristotle 
refers to as ‘the things that do not have a different cause,’ are 
the basic beings posited by the sciences.13 For if something 
                                                 
is apparently understood epistemologically rather than 
metaphysically: the things of which there are no different aitia are 
those for which the essences are immediate principles.  One either 
gets them or not.  McKirahan does not explicitly take the step of 
affirming that they have this status on account of a kind of inner 
ontological simplicity. 
13 Bronstein (2016, pp. 170-7) makes a distinction between two 
kinds of subjects posited by the sciences that study them: primary 
subjects and subordinate subjects.  Both are “basic subjects” in the 
sense I am giving the phrase here.  Bronstein’s “primary subject” 
is the generic kind of which both the ‘if it is’ and the ‘what it is’ are 
posited by the science studying it.  The specific kinds that fall under 
that are “subordinate subjects.”  Bronstein holds that in this case 
the sense of the term referring to it is assumed, but existence is 
nonetheless demonstrated (pp. 183-7).  On Bronstein’s account, 
the existence of the species of a genus is to be demonstrated on 
the basis of a prior determination of the differentiae under a genus 
(pp. 196-219).  But Aristotle nowhere takes existence claims 
concerning differentiae to be independent principles; they are in 
effect assumptions that the corresponding species exist.  Nor does 
he discuss such “demonstrations” that subordinate subjects exist.  
This is why I take the existence of both primary and subordinate 
subjects to be indemonstrable.  ‘Triangle’ can function as a 
grammatical subject, but it is not for Aristotle a kind subordinate 
to the subject matter of geometry, for at 1.10 76a35-6 he says that 
this subject matter, of which both essence and existence are 
assumed, is line (referred to as ‘magnitude’), not figure. To 
demonstrate that triangles exist is to demonstrate that lines are 
such as to form triangles when juxtaposed in a certain way.  
Demonstrable attributes of triangles (such as 2RA) are properly 
speaking demonstrable attributes of lines.  Thus when Aristotle 
appeals to demonstration that triangles are 2RA as an example of 
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has a ‘different cause,’ that is to say, is present in the world 
on account of something belonging to another kind, that 
cause would serve as a middle term of a demonstration, the 
conclusion of which would be the predication of the kind in 
question of a more fundamental subject.  For example, if the 
kind dog had a cause that was “different” from itself, call it 
M, one would demonstrate that there are dogs by means of 
a demonstration of the form “S is M, M is a dog, therefore S 
is a dog.”  The only logically possible candidate for such an 
S would be a sub-breed of dog (say, miniature schnauzer, 
where M would be a less specific sub-breed like schnauzer),14 
but being a dog is part of the essence of even such an S.  It 
                                                 
conditional necessity, he writes “Since the straight [line] is such and 
such, a triangle must have two right angles, but not since this, that 
[i.e. conversely]. Though if this were not the case, the straight line 
is not [such and such] either” (Phys. 2.9 200a16-19).  It is the 
definition of straight line, not that of triangle, that is identified as 
the premise of the demonstration that triangles are 2RA.  There 
are of course severe problems in reconstructing such a syllogism, 
but these are shared by any attempt to formulate a geometrical 
proof as based solely on definitional premises, as Aristotle thinks 
they are. 
14 Barnes (1994, p. 219) understands at least a part of the sort of 
demonstration that Aristotle has in mind along these very lines: 
“(1) Deprivation of light holds of screening by the earth. (2) 
Screening of the earth holds of eclipse. Therefore: (3) Deprivation 
of light holds of eclipse.”  On Barnes’ account, this sort of 
demonstration could just as well work with ‘miniature schnauzer’ 
as minor term, as he takes the distinction between what has a cause 
other than itself and what does not as the distinction between 
derived terms and primitive terms (p. 217).  Barnes is unable to 
integrate his understanding of the what has a cause different from 
itself with his account of the sort of demonstration that reveals a 
definition, for which reason he condemns 2.9 as a “muddle” (p. 
221).   
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is what S is, for which reason neither S nor a definitional 
attribute of S would not be a cause ‘different from’ dog.  That 
S is a dog would be posited in the definition of S, and that 
this definition refers would be ensured by the ‘hypothesis’ 
that there is in fact such a thing as S.15    
Accordingly, the canonical form of demonstration is “S 
is M, M is P; therefore S is P,” where S is a basic subject and 
P is a predicate that is kath’ hauto sumbebēkos of S, that is, not 
included in the essence of S although it is demonstrable of S.  
S, as a basic subject, does not have a cause different from 
itself.  P, as a demonstrable predicate, does have a cause 
different from itself; this will be M, S, or an intermediate 
middle term.  For this reason, Distinction C turns out to map 
onto Distinction A and Distinction B.  The features of reality 
treated by each science can be classified into two groups.  
The first is constituted by certain primary subject kinds, both 
generic and specific.  Although they may be ontologically 
dependent on other beings (as mathematical entities are 
quantities ontological dependent on their inherence in 
substances), the sciences that study them regard them as 
basic.  (It is of no concern to the mathematician qua 
mathematician that a quantity under consideration is a 
quantitative aspect of a substance.)16  That they exist, as 
having the basic features that they have, is presumed by 
those demonstrations that show why they have the derivative 
features that they have.17  This is why each science considers 
                                                 
15 On this see Goldin (1996, pp. 61-9). 
16 On this see 1.13 79a6-10. 
17 “Proper [to each science] are, on the hand, those things which it 
assumes to be, about which the science studies the things that 
belong kath’ hauta, for example, arithmetic assumes the monad, and 
geometry lines and points, for they assume these to be and to be 
just this” (1.10 76b3-6).  Note that at 76b6-7 these entities, for 
 Owen Goldin 57 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 42, n. 4, pp. 44-84, Oct-Dec. 2019. 
them as having no cause different from those kinds 
themselves.  The definitional features of these kinds belong 
to this same group, for, although linguistically and 
conceptually they can be regarded by themselves (for 
example, being rational can in a way be conceptually isolated 
from being human) the positing of the essence and existence 
of the basic kinds is at the same time the positing of their 
definitional features. 
The other class of beings considered by the science is 
made up of those things that do have a cause different from 
themselves.  It is natural to read the distinction between 
things for which the cause is different and those for which it 
is not to be exhaustive.  Given that the things for which there 
is no different cause are the basic subjects, of which each 
science assumes both the essence and the existence, we 
would expect that the things with a different cause (those 
whose definitions can in a sense be demonstrated), are the 
items (considered by a science) other than those basic 
subjects.  According to Aristotle’s syllogistic scheme, terms 
either appear as subjects or predicates.  So those things for 
which there is a different cause will appear in demonstrations 
as predicates of the basic subjects.  This class will exclude 
definitional predicates, for as noted above, these predicates 
are what their subjects are, and hence are not different from 
the subjects.  It will be the class of pathē kath’ hauta or kath’ 
hauta sumbebēkota of the subject kind in question.  Distinction 
C is to be identified with Distinctions A and B. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
which there are no middle terms that can express their cause, are 
distinguished from the pathē kath’ hauta, identified as the other 
entities proper to the sciences. 
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III 
 
There is a wrinkle here: Aristotle’s theory of 
demonstration admits of some subject terms that are not 
basic subjects, insofar as their existence is not presumed by 
the science that studies them but needs to be demonstrated.  
Aristotle’s stock example here is that of the triangle.  It is 
demonstrable that triangles are 2RA, but even though it 
would seem to be the case that triangle is the minor term of 
this demonstration, triangle is not a simple subject; one must 
demonstrate that there are triangles (1.1 71a14-16, 1.10 
76a31-6).  Following McKirahan (1992) let us call these 
‘derivative subjects’.  Note that any demonstration that such 
exist would have to be on the basis of the principles 
concerning simple subjects.  The demonstration that 
triangles exist would have to resemble the proof of Euclid 
Elements 1.1 (which constructs an equilateral triangle on a 
given line) insofar as, on the basis of what we know about 
lines, we can show that they are such as to be arranged in a 
way that satisfies what we mean by the term ‘triangle’.18  
‘Triangle’ then would be a nominalization of the predicate 
‘such as to be a side of a triangular figure when arranged in a 
certain way’, inherent in ‘straight line’ or ‘magnitude’.  
“Triangles are 2RA” is a short way of saying “lines are such 
that when arranged in a certain way they form the side of a 
three sided figure that is 2RA” and so forth.19  For this 
reason, Distinction D, between atomic or simple subjects on 
                                                 
18 On this see McKirahan (1992, pp. 144-8). 
19 This is parallel to how a predication like “the color is bright” is 
to be ontologically understood as the predication of an attribute 
(bright color) of the substance that is the metaphysical subject of 
the color. 
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the one hand, and derivative subjects, on the other, turns out 
to be a subset of (or identical to20) Distinctions A, B, and C.21 
 
 
IV 
 
I read APo. 2.8 as working through how one can cull a 
kind of (nonfoundational) definition of demonstrable 
attribute or derivative subject on the basis of the 
demonstration concluding that such an entity holds of a 
basic subject.  The demonstrations that are, in a sense, 
demonstrations of the definitions of such items do not have 
the definitions in question as their conclusions. That is to 
say, the demonstration that reveals the definition of P does 
not have a conclusion of the form “a P is such and such.” 
The term whose definitions is revealed is not the minor term 
of the syllogisms in question.   Rather, because “in all of these 
cases it is clear that the what is it and the why is it are the 
same” (2.2 90a14-5), the middle term of a demonstration that 
a basic subject S is P will be the cause of P, and once that 
middle term is revealed, a definitional formula of P can be 
compiled. 22   Aristotle discusses two examples.  By 
                                                 
20 I make this suggestion at Goldin (1996, pp. 148-50). 
21 McKirahan (1992, p. 38) admits that on his account Aristotle is 
inconsistent at 1.10 76b3-10, where he distinguishes two kinds of 
entities studied by a science: subjects (of which the existence is 
assumed) and attributes (of which the existence is demonstrated).  
For McKirahan’s “derivative subjects” fall in neither group.  On 
my account, the alleged inconsistency disappears.  For more on 
understanding derivative subjects as demonstrable attributes, see 
Goldin (2004). 
22 At APo. 2.10 94a9-14 the basic subjects of the sciences are called 
immediates (for unlike the demonstrable predicates, there is no 
middle term between them and a more basic subject).  Aristotle 
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demonstrating that the blocking of light that we identify with 
an eclipse belongs to the moon, by the middle term 
‘interposition of the earth’ we, in a sense, ‘demonstrate’ that 
the (lunar) eclipse is a blocking of light from the moon that 
results from the interposition of the earth (2.8 94b4-7).  By 
demonstrating that the noise that we identify as thunder 
belongs to the clouds, on the basis of the middle term 
‘quenching of fire’, we, in a sense ‘demonstrate’ that thunder 
is a noise that results from the quenching of fire in the clouds 
(2.8 93b8-14).23 
This is possible only if we already have a reliable way of 
identifying the explanandum, so that we can show that those 
features by which we identify it follow from and are 
explained by the essence of basic subjects.  This is why in the 
explanations that Aristotle sketches the explanandum P is 
initially identified with a complex24 of other terms, say Q and 
R.  This might be done on pre-theoretical grounds.25 The 
middle term M of the demonstration concluding that S is Q 
and R, will express why S is Q and R, and one can therefore 
on the basis of the demonstration formulate a definition of 
P as “Q and R in S on account of M.”  Aristotle’s examples 
are that we begin with the initial identification of a lunar 
eclipse with a certain occlusion of light from the moon (or 
                                                 
there contrasts their definitions with those which are revealed by 
the kind of demonstration discussed in 2.8, which will express the 
middle term by which the kind in question belongs to a basic 
subject. 
23 On this see Landor (1985). 
24 In the simplest cast this will be a conjunction. 
25 On this, the first stage of definition, see Charles (2000, pp. 64-
67, 198-213).  On the basis of his account of the three stages of 
Aristotelian definition, Charles finds in Aristotle the elements of a 
semantic theory for natural kind terms for all definienda. 
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even with the moon’s failure to cast shadows, though full), 
or of thunder as a certain noise in the clouds.  We 
demonstrate that Q and R belong to S.  Given the premise 
that identifies P with Q and R, we can infer that S is P.  So, 
having demonstrated that a certain occlusion of light belongs 
to the moon, we can then in a sense demonstrate that the 
moon is eclipsed, on the basis of the premise that this 
occlusion is an eclipse.26  
 
 
V   
 
One might object to this this line of interpretation on the 
grounds that demonstrable attributes necessarily inhere in 
their subjects (1.4 73a21, 1.6 75a28-31) and always inhere in 
them (1.8 75b22-5).  But at first sight that does not conform 
to Aristotle’s own examples here: eclipse and thunder.27  For 
eclipsing is not a universal, necessary attribute of the moon, 
                                                 
26 At 2.8 93a30 Aristotle identifies the terms of a syllogism as 
follows: “eclipse A, moon C, blocking of by the earth B.”  This 
syllogism cannot be understood as an explanatory demonstration, 
for it presupposes that A is B which is the very explanation in 
question.  The real explanatory work would consist in two 
demonstrations, first, that B entails the set of attributes by which 
we identify an eclipse (for example, not producing a shadow during 
the full moon, 93a37-8, and second, that C is B.  (I take it that this 
demonstration would be among “the remaining logoi” referred to 
at 93b13-4.) On this see Goldin (1996, pp. 144-6). 
27 Angioni’s understanding of the requirement that the principles 
of demonstration be necessary as that they be requisite for 
explanation allows non-necessary states of affairs to fall within the 
ambit of demonstration.  See Angioni (2014, p. 103).  But the 
problem that “for the most part” predications and occasional 
events are not eternal, as demonstrables are supposed to be, would 
still remain. 
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since the moon is not always eclipsed.  Similarly, clouds do 
not always thunder, nor do they thunder of necessity.  
Accordingly Ferejohn has argued that the beings for which 
there is a different cause are events, and that the middle term 
of the demonstrations that account for them are the efficient 
causes of those events. 28   On this understanding a 
demonstration of the sort that explains a lunar eclipse does 
not conform to the canonical form of demonstration 
discussed in Book 1, in which the explananda are the facts 
that certain necessary and eternal features are predicated of 
kinds studied by the sciences.29     
                                                 
28 Ferejohn (2013, pp. 131-54).  Ferejohn does not take Aristotle 
to be fully aware that the “causal model” of demonstration does 
not conform to the “canonical” syllogistic model of Book 1.  He 
rather sees a deep tension implicit in Aristotle’s views on how 
explanations in natural science proceed. 
29 Further evidence that the main point that Aristotle is making in 
2.8 does not concern events is found at APo. 2.2 90a31-4 and 2.8 
93a33-5.  (Lucas Angioni and Breno Zuppolini brought to my 
attention the relevance of the first passage.)  There, in the context 
of his discussion of how the definition of an eclipse is to be 
“demonstrated”, Aristotle employs the demonstration that a 
triangle is 2RA as an example showing how the middle term of a 
demonstration reveals the cause of the conclusion.  Also note that 
back at 2.2 90a24-30 Aristotle offers two examples of how the 
‘what it is’ is the same as the ‘why it is.’  The first is a lunar eclipse, 
the second is an acoustic concord.  A concord might be temporally 
localizable, but the concord between middle C and the G that is a 
fifth above it is an eternal feature of the notes.  A demonstration 
that the two notes are in concord is not as such revealing the cause 
of a particular event; nor is it saying that the subject of the concord 
(air? strings?) is such as to sometimes or regularly stand in the 
relationship of a concord with another subject.  Like all 
demonstrations, it is providing insight into an eternal necessary 
feature of the subject kind of a science. 
 Owen Goldin 63 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 42, n. 4, pp. 44-84, Oct-Dec. 2019. 
Can Aristotle’s theory account for the demonstrations 
that explain occasional particular phenomena like eclipses or 
thunder?  The proper object of scientific knowledge is not 
the particular event of an eclipse or thunder; it is rather the 
necessary, eternal fact that the moon is such as to eclipse, 
and the clouds are such as to thunder. The middle term, 
explaining what it is about the subject that make them 
subject to such events, could be employed to reveal why the 
events occur when and how they do. (For example, by 
showing why the moon is such as to have an orbit that results 
in the blockage of the sun’s light from its surface, one could 
account for a particular occurrence of an eclipse, but that 
occurrence would not be a proper object of scientific 
explanation.30)  Just as Aristotle says that in a sense the one 
who knows that the interior angles of a triangle add up to 
two right angles knows it about some particular triangle (1.1 
71a31-b6), so too the one who understands the workings of 
lunar eclipses in some way understands why and how a 
particular eclipse occurs. To use an Aristotelian locution 
absent from the Posterior Analytics, the actual astronomer has 
the potentiality for rendering intelligible the particular 
eclipse.  There is no need to suppose that the only sort of 
entity such as to have its definition revealed through 
demonstration in the manner accounted for in 2.8 is an event 
for which one can demonstrate that it occasionally or 
regularly holds of a basic subject.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30  It could however be considered an object of scientific 
understanding in an accidental sense (1.8 75b24-5) for one can 
apply the demonstration concerning the moon’s eternal character 
of being susceptible to an eclipse to the moon at the time of its 
being eclipsed. 
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VI 
 
I now turn to consider the nature of demonstrable 
predicates and the role that they play in Aristotle’s general 
theory of demonstration. 
Commentators often write as though Aristotelian 
demonstrations are a matter of unpacking the genus-species 
relations implicit in the definition or ‘what is it’ of a minor 
term.  For example, if the minor term S is its definition “G 
and D”, and G itself is defined as G′ and D′, the form of an 
Aristotelian demonstration would be “S is G, G is G′; 
therefore S is G.′”  An example is “Flounder are fish, fish are 
animals; therefore flounder are animals.”31  (Note that on the 
account argued for above, none of these terms would be 
‘different from’ the minor term.)  This view has several 
advantages.  First, both premises are definitional, so it is easy 
to see how it is the case that a demonstration is based on 
unmediated premises that are first principles of the sciences.  
Second, Aristotle’s own argument in 1.22-23 that no 
demonstration is of infinite length itself presupposes that all 
demonstrative premises are of this sort.  But even if we grant 
that some demonstrations do indeed take this form, there are 
                                                 
31  See for example Barnes (1994, p. 119), Tierney (2001), and 
McKirahan (1992, pp. 111-21).  On these views, all demonstrable 
attributes are implicit in some kind of basic account of the subject, 
whether we call it the “what is it” (Tierney) or a “fat definition” 
(McKirahan).  This reduces demonstrations to rendering 
tautologies explicit, which would seem to exclude from the scope 
of demonstration propositions like “all triangles are 2RA”.  Taking 
this to be Aristotle’s view ascribes to him an ignorance of the logic 
of mathematical proof that goes well beyond the commonly 
recognized error of taking all mathematical proofs to conform to 
his syllogistic.  This is one of the main reasons why I opt for the 
account of demonstrated attributes that I present in Goldin (1996) 
and here. 
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severe problems in interpreting Aristotle as holding the view 
that they all do.  First, demonstrative conclusions would 
thereby be limited to tautologies (at least for those who have 
mastered the appropriate science and for that reason have 
command of the relevant definitions).  Second, it is hard to 
see how the middle term of such a demonstration could 
serve as identifying the cause of conclusion.  Being a fish is 
not the cause of a flounder’s being an animal in any 
straightforward way, as being animal is simply what a fish is.  
(Being an animal “has no other cause”.)  Third, Aristotle’s 
own examples, such as 2RA, belie this view.  On no plausible 
interpretation can we interpret Aristotle as taking this 
predicate to be part of the definition of triangle.   
The demonstrable attributes are the kath’ hauta pathē and 
the kath’ hauta sumbebēkota. That they are not definitional 
presumably accounts for their being said to be accidental 
(sumbebēkos).32  But in what sense are they kath’ hauta?  We 
                                                 
32 At 1.4 73b4-5 Aristotle says that accidents are terms that hold 
neither as having the predicate in the definitions of the subject nor 
as having the subject in the definition of the predicate.  If this is 
the sense of kath’ hauto employed in the expression kath’ hauto 
sumbebēkos, my proposal below that the terms for which the subject 
is in the definition of the predicate are the kath’ hauta sumbebēkota 
is easily refuted.  There are two possible ways of dealing with the 
difficulty.  The first is to see Aristotle as making a distinction 
between accidents and things that belong per accidens; the kath’ 
hauta sumbebēkota would belong to the former but not the latter.  
This proposal is made by McKirahan (1992, p. 286, n. 60).  The 
second is to see the term kath’ hauto sumbebēkos as involving sense 
of ‘accident’ according to which it refers only to what is not kath’ 
hauto in the sense of having the predicate in the definition of the 
subject.  This is supported by Meta. Δ 30 1025a30-2: “‘Accident’ 
has another sense, that of that of all of those <predicates> that 
belong in each thing kath’ hauto though they are not in the essence 
(ousia), for example two right angles to triangle.”  It is presumably 
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can presume that Aristotle takes them to be kath’ hauta in at 
least one of the four senses of the term that he delineated 
just a few lines above.33  We have already noted that they 
cannot be definitional.  This excludes the first sense of kath’ 
hauto distinguished in 1.4 (which I refer to as kath’ hauto 1): 
“Those things are kath’ hauta, first, which belong in the ‘what 
is it’ [of their subject] (73a34-5).”34  Two other possibilities 
have emerged (not mutually exclusive).  The first is that the 
relevant sense is the fourth which Aristotle outlines at 1.4 
73b10-11: “that which belongs to each thing because of itself 
(di’ hauto) is kath’ hauto”.  This formulation itself suggests that 
Aristotle is saying that whenever S is P because of S we can 
say that S is P is kath’ hauto.  But the example that Aristotle 
proceeds to give (the animal’s death is kath’ hauto in respect 
to its being sacrificed), shows that, even if the exact 
predicative form of the connection is unclear, the entities 
that Aristotle takes to be kath’ hauta in this sense are 
                                                 
the fact that the predicate is not in the essence that accounts for its 
being an accident.   
33 Barnes (1994), pp. 113-4, 120-22 denies this.  But 1.4 73b31-2, 
in which triangle is explicitly said to be 2RA kath’ hauto, follows 
shortly after the delineation of the four senses of kath’ hauto. 
34 I am following scholarly consensus in presuming that huparkhei 
(‘belong to’) here has its usual sense of ‘is predicated of’, which is 
confirmed by the argument of 1.22 84a11-29, which presupposes 
that kath’ hauta 1 predicates can serve as middle terms, and 
accordingly belong to their subjects insofar as they are predicated 
of them in their definitions.  These are the predicates identified as 
kath’ hauta in Meta. Δ 18 1022a27-9.   There is unfortunately a 
problem in understanding the examples that Aristotle gives at 
73a35, for a triangle is not a line, and a line is not a point.  However, 
as I suggested above, ‘triangle’ is not properly understood as a 
subject, but as an attribute of lines: ‘such as to form a triangular 
figure when arranged in certain way’. 
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particular events, not kinds of event or regular or necessary 
features of being subject to a kind of event (for example, 
being such as to be subject to eclipse).  This suggests that 
entities that are kath’ hauta in this sense will fall outside the 
scope of demonstration, though, to be sure, demonstrations 
can be employed to make sense of them.  (The situation is 
parallel to how demonstrations concerning triangle in 
general can be employed to render intelligible some feature 
of a particular triangle, cf. 1.1 71a29-72b8).  This objection 
is not decisive however, as Aristotle could be understood as 
identifying a kind of intelligible connection between kinds of 
events, and these are predicates.  It might be an incidental 
feature of Aristotle’s examples that they are cases in which 
the predicates that stand in relation are kinds of temporally 
localizable events.35  There is however another problem with 
understanding the kath’ hauta sumbebēkota as kath’ hauta in the 
sense of 1.4 73b10-11.  At Topics 2.3 110b22-5 Aristotle says 
2RA is sumbebēkos in respect to isosceles but not triangle.  At 
APo. 1.4 73b38-74a3 we are told that 2RA is kath’ hauto in 
respect to triangle, not isosceles triangle.  This is because a 
term definitional of ‘triangle’ as such (and not its genus or a 
subordinate species) must feature as a middle term of the 
demonstration that triangles are 2RA. 36   Showing that 
isosceles triangles are 2RA is properly accomplished only by 
means of an application of that demonstration. 37   Any 
                                                 
35 This is the suggestion of Zuppolini (2018, 130).  
36 Zuppolini (2018, pp. 120-1) points out the relevance of these 
passages to the question of why exactly the kath’ hauta sumbebēkota 
are kath’ hauta.  As noted below, he reaches conclusions different 
from mine.    
37 Such an application is a demonstration, in a sense.  Accordingly, 
2RA is kath’ hauto sumbebēkos of isosceles, in a sense.  Aristotle is 
using the terms kath’ hauto, sumbebēkos, and apodeiktikos 
(demonstrative) in such secondary senses at 1.6 75a18-20: “There 
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demonstration that proceeds to show that isosceles triangles 
are 2RA on the basis of features unique to isosceles triangles 
misses the point insofar as it fails to identify the more basic 
feature that is ontologically responsible for the derivative 
feature.38  But in the cases described at 1.4 73b10-11 all that 
is necessary is that the kath’ hauto feature arises on account 
of (dia) that of which it is kath’ hauto, as its effect.39  There is 
no requirement that the latter be referred to at the 
appropriate level of specificity.  In the very case that Aristotle 
                                                 
is no demonstrative understanding of the things that are 
sumbebēkota yet are not kath’ hauta, according to how we have 
defined “the things that are kath’ hauta, for it is not possible to 
prove the conclusion of necessity.”  For it is possible to prove that 
isosceles are 2RA.  Thanks are due to Breno Zuppolini for 
indicating the problem that these lines might be thought to raise 
for my account. 
38 On this see Angioni (2016, pp. 95-9). 
39 Zuppolini (2018, pp. 130-2) in contrast gives dia here a strong 
sense, according to which the object of the preposition is precisely 
the being that is responsible for the predicate, considered at the 
proper level of specificity.  So on his account the kath’ hauta 
sumbebēkota are kath’ hauta in the fourth sense of the phrase 
delineated in 1.4, as well as the second sense (that of the kath’ hauta 
2 predicates);  kath’ hauta 2 predications including those like 
“isosceles is 2RA” are kath’ hauta in a looser sense.  Like Code 
(1986, p. 351) I give dia a weaker sense, so that “isosceles is 2RA” 
is kath’ hauto in the fourth sense, but would not be kath’ hauta 
sumbebēkos as it would not be the conclusion of a properly formed 
demonstration.  I deny that “isosceles is 2RA” meets Aristotle’s 
criterion for being kath’ hauto since, unlike Zuppolini, for whom 
Aristotle is requiring that isosceles be (somehow) metaphysically 
present in the definition of 2RA, I am saying that it would have to 
be actually present.  (On this see Section 7, below.)  It is not, but 
as I will argue, triangle is. 
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presents as an example, we lack that proper specification.  
Whether to sphattesthai refers to sacrifice or throat cutting, the 
term is too specific to be cause of death as such.40  I suggest 
that this sense of kath’ hauto is not relevant for demonstrative 
science.  Aristotle is bringing up the term for the sense of 
completeness.41   
By elimination, we can conclude that the kath’ hauta 
sumbebēkota are those that are such that their subjects are 
present in their definitions (1.4 73a37-b3), which I call kath’ 
hauta 2.  Aristotle is explicit that all demonstrated predicates 
are kath’ hauta in one of the first two senses: that of having 
the predicate present in the subject and that of having the 
subject present in the predicate (1.4 73b16-18, 6.74b5-12, 
22.84a11-14). Since the first, third, and fourth senses of kath’ 
hauto are not the relevant ones, the ‘natural reading’ is to take 
the second to be the relevant sense.  On this account, the 
distinction between kath’ hauta 1 predicates and kath’ hauta 2 
predicates, which (grouping among the kath’ hauta 1 
predicates the subjects for which they are definitional) is 
Distinction E, turns out to map onto Distinctions A, B, C, 
and D.42 
                                                 
40 The proper cause of death would have to be something like loss 
of vital heat. 
41 The same can be said of the sense of the term discussed at 75b5-
10, to refer to a subject not inherent in any more basic subject (or 
not considered as so inherent in the context of a science) which is 
not further employed in the work. 
42 As Breno Zuppolini has stressed to me, Distinction E can’t be 
strictly speaking the same as the others, since an attribute, even a 
demonstrated attribute, has a “what is it” and can therefore serve 
as a subject of a kath’ hauto 1 predication.  “Eclipses are occlusions 
of light” is kath’ hauto 1, for example.  Distinction E would be 
identical with the others only if we say that only expressions of 
“what is it” that will be relevant in determining whether or not a 
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VII 
 
This reading has encountered resistance because in many 
cases, including Aristotle’s own favored example of 2RA, 
Aristotle’s description of kath’ hauta 2 predicates simply does 
not hold.  The definition of ‘having angles equal to two right 
angles,’ whatever it may be43 does not contain ‘triangle’.44  
This is so even though no other plane figures have their 
interior angles summing to two right angles.   
Zuppolini addresses this objection by appeal to a 
distinction familiar in the secondary literature on Aristotle, 
that between ‘linguistic predication’ and ‘metaphysical 
predication’.  Linguistic predication is a relation between 
terms in a logos: whenever we say that S is P we are saying “S 
is P”.  Metaphysical predication is a relation that holds 
among realities.  In the case in which ‘S’ signifies shoe and 
‘P’ signifies pink, the linguistic predication “S is P” indicates 
that pink is metaphysically predicated of shoe.  As this 
example shows, linguistic predication often mirrors 
metaphysical predication, like true propositions in a 
Russellian ‘logically perfect language’.45  Logos depends on 
                                                 
predication is kath’ hauto 1 or 2 will be those of first principles of 
the sciences. 
43  It would be reasonable to suppose that it is based on the 
definitions or primitive notions of sum and of right angle. 
44 See Tiles (1983), p. 7: “In no sense would it seem to be the case 
that 'triangle' belongs in the definition of '2R'.” As I show below, 
the scientific definition of 2RA must mention its cause, and its 
cause is triangle (or more precisely, lines arrayed in a triangular 
fashion), not some other figure. 
45 “In a logically perfect language the words in a proposition would 
correspond one by one with the components of the corresponding 
fact.”  Russell (1918, p. 520). 
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this kind of isomorphism (DI 1 16a3-9).  But the 
isomorphism is often merely apparent.  Categories shows how 
linguistic predications that are formally indistinguishable 
express metaphysical predications of very different kinds.46  
On one influential account of the central books of the 
Metaphysics,47  Aristotle re-employs the distinction between 
linguistic and metaphysical predication as a way of resolving 
ontological perplexities brought on by his hylomorphic 
analysis of substance: in spite of the truth of the linguistic 
proposition “Socrates is human,” the form ‘human’ is 
metaphysically predicated not of the composite substance 
Socrates but of Socrates’ matter.  Even if Aristotle does not 
envisage a logically perfect language as such, Aristotle shares 
with Russell the convictions that metaphysical perplexities 
arise through being misled by the surface grammar of 
linguistic statements, and that ontological analysis largely 
consists in showing how this is so and through formulating 
(in a technical vocabulary) how things actually stand.  That 
means that Aristotle thinks that it is in principle possible to 
formulate linguistic predications isomorphic to the 
metaphysical predications in the world. 
Zuppolini employs this distinction between linguistic and 
metaphysical predication in his solution of the problem of 
how to find a place for the kath’ hauta sumbebēkota in the 
typology of kath’ hauta predications given in APo. 1.4.  To 
say that S is P is kath’ hauto 2 is not necessarily to say that S 
is linguistically predicated in the definition of P.  It might be 
(as it is in the case of “number is odd”) but it need not be.  
“The fact that the subjects of per se 2 predications ‘inhere in’ 
                                                 
46 These are the relations of ‘being said of’ and ‘being in,’ the 
converses of which Code (1986) has labelled ‘izzing’ and ‘hazzing’ 
respectively.  
47 Lewis (1992). 
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the λόγος of the predicates does not make them linguistic 
items. Since the word ‘λόγος’ denotes here the definition of 
an entity (and not of a term), neither are the predicates (i.e. 
the corresponding definienda) linguistic items. Therefore, per 
se 2 48  connections are also world-world relations (or 
metaphysical predications).”49  On this account, “triangle is 
2RA” is a kath’ hauto 2 predication because triangle (or 
triangularity?) is metaphysically predicated in the attribute of 
2RA.  But what does this mean? 
Zuppolini argues that a kath’ hauto 2 predication need not 
have the subject linguistically present in the definition of the 
predicate, even if the definition is a scientific one, formulated 
with as much accuracy and perspicuity as possible.  For in 
Metaphysics Δ 18 1022a 29-31 Aristotle gives as an example of 
a kath’ hauto 2 predication “the surface is white.”  Here the 
subject is not surface, understood universally, but a particular 
surface, and surely Aristotle is not suggesting that the 
particular surface is even metaphysically present in the 
definition of white.  After all, the particular surface will come 
and go, but the definition of white abides eternal.  For this 
reason, Zuppolini suggests the following as what Aristotle 
has in mind: “a subject S ‘inheres in’ (ἐνυπάρχει) the 
definition of a predicate P if the relevant kind-term ‘K’ 
applying to S appears in the definition of P”.50   Zuppolini 
argues that this allows us to understand why “triangle is 
2RA” is kath’ hauto 2.  Triangles are a variety of rectilinear 
figure, and it is rectilinear figures that are (metaphysically) 
present in the definition of 2RA.  For to be 2RA is to have 
interior angles, and even if this or that account of what it is 
to have interior angles does not mention ‘rectilinear figure’, 
                                                 
48 This is Zuppolini’s term for kath’ hauta 2 predications. 
49 Zuppolini (2018, p. 123). 
50 Zuppolini (2018, p. 127). 
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the notion is implicit, for which reason the attribute of being 
a rectilinear figure is metaphysically present in the definition 
of 2RA.   
To be sure, even if Aristotle’s writings sometimes seem 
to be subject to use/mention confusion, he is aware both of 
the distinction between a state of affairs and the linguistic 
account that expresses it, as well as of the philosophical 
confusion that can arise from reading ontological truth 
directly off of the structure of a linguistic predication.  
Definitions and demonstrations are both linguistic entities.  
A definition cannot reveal what something is, and a 
demonstration cannot reveal why something is the case, if 
that which it expresses does not correspond to reality.  
Terms need to be disambiguated and basic assumptions need 
to be made explicit.  Accordingly, a demonstration can only 
do its job of isolating and explicating metaphysical relations 
if the premises and conclusion of the demonstration are 
formulated in a perspicuous way.   
So I see no reason to think that Aristotle would ever deny 
that what is metaphysically present in the essence of a kind 
will be linguistically present in an adequate scientific 
definition of the kind, though it may well not be present in 
the initial grasp of the meaning of the term denoting the kind 
in question.51  The “natural reading” according to which the 
                                                 
51 The big exception here, for which linguistic predication is unable 
to adequately explicate the ontological relations involved in 
metaphysical predication, is that of the metaphysical predication by 
which form belongs to matter.  This is because within the 
metaphysical predication, the predicate and subject form a unity 
referred to by a single term even though they are metaphysically 
different aspects of that unity.  It is in regard to this relationship 
that Code and Lewis have insisted on the importance of the 
distinction between metaphysical and linguistic predication in 
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subject is (linguistically) predicated in the definition of the 
demonstrated attribute, is the correct one. 52  But how?   
                                                 
Aristotle’s thought.  But science as described within APo. does not 
deal with form and its relation to matter. 
52 Note that what Zuppolini calls the “natural reading,” which 
takes the kath’ hauta sumbebēkota to be kath’ hauta 2, does not 
identify the two classes of predicates.  For there are two other kinds 
of predicates that are explicitly identified as kath’ hauta on the 
grounds that the subject is present in the definition of the predicate 
and would accordingly be kath’ hauta 2.  The first is a kind of 
predicative bond in which the predicate is by definition a 
determination of the subject.  Aristotle’s favorite example is “nose 
is snub”  (Meta. Z 5 1030b14-20).  This kind of predication is of 
special interest to Aristotle, as the predicate is a linguistic unit but 
refers to a metaphysical complex of a determination in what is 
determined, and Aristotle takes a term referring to a natural 
substance to do exactly the same thing (since it is a single term 
referring to a form/matter composite).  On no construal could 
snubness be understood as a demonstrable predicate of a nose.  
The second is a case in which the predicate is paired with an 
opposing predicate, in such a way that the relevant subject must 
have one or the other predicate belong to it.  This kind is illustrated 
by the examples that Aristotle explicitly gives in 1.4 of this kind of 
predicate: odd and even of number, curved and straight of line, etc. 
(73a38-b1).  Odd is not a demonstrable predicate of number, 
though conceivably it could be considered a demonstrable 
predicate of some number (although at APo. 2 13 96a35-8 it is 
understood as a definitional predicate of the number three).  But 
at 73b19-23, when defending his claim that the kath’ hauta 
predicates considered by the sciences are necessary, Aristotle does 
not do so on the grounds that any given kath’ hauto predicate 
follows of necessity from its subject but by indicating that a kath’ 
hauto 1 or 2 predicate holds of its subject either “without 
qualification or in regard to the opposites”, appealing to the 
disjunction “a number is necessarily even insofar as it is not odd”.  
Aristotle is either saying that a disjunctive predicate (such as even 
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VIII 
 
I have argued that those items said to “have another 
cause” in 2.8 and 9 are none other than the kath’ hauta 
sumbebēkota.  Understood in such a way, APo. 2.8 shows 
exactly how it is the case that the kath’ hauta sumbebēkota, even 
those like 2RA, do indeed have their subjects present in their 
definitions. 
Recall that for the demonstration of the definition of P 
to be the vehicle by which that definition becomes known, 
that very definition cannot be presupposed by the 
demonstration in question; otherwise the demonstration 
would be question begging.  Nonetheless, there is an 
explanandum, the attribute or phenomenon in question, for 
which one has at least a preliminary understanding.  Call F 
what is identified by such an account of P.  (This may well 
be a conjunction of attributes.)  To show how the features 
by which P is identified follow the essence of subject S53 one 
must demonstrate that S is F by means of the middle term 
                                                 
or odd) is necessarily predicated of a subject (number) or that a 
single predicate like even is demonstrable on the basis of 
something like a disjunctive syllogism.  Both suggestions have 
problems; Aristotle does not say that “odd or even” is the kath’ 
hauto predicate in question; rather odd is, or even is.  The second 
suggestion is problematic insofar as Aristotelian logic does not 
admit of formalizing a disjunctive syllogism.  I take the latter 
problem to be less severe; after all, mathematical proofs in general 
do not admit of formalization by Aristotelian syllogistic alone, yet 
Aristotle seems blissfully unaware of this, even as he employs 
mathematical proofs as core examples of mathematical 
demonstrations. 
53 In the case of some if not all cases of P, this will follow more 
than one essence: the distinctive sound of thunder follows the 
essences of water and fire; the distinctive appearance of an eclipse 
follows the essence of more than one celestial body, and so forth.   
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M.  On this basis, we can extract a definition of P as an F in 
S, by virtue of M. 
If all demonstrations of kath’ hauta sumbebekota are indeed 
of this form, there are two important results to which I 
would like to draw special attention.  First, we can see why it 
is the case that demonstrable characteristics include their 
subjects in their definitions.  For if the scientific definition 
of P is “F as predicated of S, by virtue of M” then S 
necessarily is present in the definition of P.  (Because F is 
predicated of S, whatever is F is S.  Accordingly, whatever is 
P is S.)   
As noted above, the demonstration that explains what 
thunder or eclipse is will not primarily account for the 
individual events of thunder or eclipse (for such are 
temporally localizable particulars) but the universal necessary 
character of being such as to undergo such an event.  And 
this, by definition, will have the subject of that character 
predicated within its definition.  Further, we can see why it 
is the case that an attribute, scientifically understood, will 
convert with its subject; the thesis that a demonstrable 
predicate is a ‘commensurate universal’.54  P not only follows 
                                                 
54 For a defense of the traditional understanding that demonstrable 
predicates are commensurately universal with their subjects see 
Inwood (1979, pp. 320-3).  I differ from Inwood in my 
understanding of why demonstrable predicates are commensurate 
with their subjects.  On the basis of 1 24 83b23-7, Inwood takes 
the kath’ hauto sumbebēkota to be commensurately universal insofar 
as they are “self explanatory”: the predicate’s cause, the nature of 
its subject, is “internal” to it.  As I have argued here, this is not 
how Aristotle conceives of things.  The cause of 2RA is the line, 
which is not internal to 2RA.  The cause of being subject to the 
eclipse is not internal to that attribute, but is “something different”: 
the nature of the moon.  83b23-7 should be interpreted as saying 
that the subject of a kath’ hauto predication (which is universal) is 
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from the essence of S (and other premises); S follows from 
the essence of P.55 56 
                                                 
the cause of the predicate for that predicate itself (where hautōi 
modifies ti). 
55 We can on this basis answer Barnes’ denial that “I2” (kath’ hauta 
2) predicates are the kath’ hauta sumbebēkota: “[T]he suggestion that 
I2-predicates are, or at least include, ‘in itself incidentals’ is an 
attractive one.  But it will not do: ‘being capable of understanding’ 
is proper to man; but ‘All men are capable of understanding’ is not 
an I2 predication.  Again, being deciduous is an ‘in itself incidental’ 
of vines, but not a property of them.” Barnes (1994, p. 114).  On 
the account presented here, ‘being capable of understanding,’ if 
demonstrable and not definitional, would in fact have ‘man’ in its 
scientific definition.  (If the gods are capable of understanding, it 
would be only in an equivocal sense.  Cf. 2.7 99b4-7.)  ‘Deciduous’ 
is properly speaking demonstrable not of ‘vine’ but ‘broad-leafed 
plant’ (2.16 98b5-10; ‘broad-leafed plant’ is the totality of subject 
terms of shedding referred to at 2.17 99a244-5). 
56 Note that in a well-formed demonstration, not only do the major 
and minor terms convert.  The major and middle terms convert.  
Angioni (2018, p. 162) has argued that Aristotle’s main conclusion 
at 1.13 78b13-28 is that “one important ingredient of the notion of 
an appropriate explanation is the notion of reciprocation between 
cause and effect: being a primary cause that delivers the 
appropriate explanation of its effect involves (but does not collapse 
into) being a necessary and sufficient condition for its effect to 
obtain”.   If all proper demonstrations are of the form discussed in 
2.8, then for any predicate P which is kath’ hauto sumbebēkos in 
respect to S, the demonstration that S is P will be through a middle 
term which expresses the essence of P.  (On this point I agree with 
Angioni (2014).)  In a well-formed demonstration the middle term 
must convert with the major term. Unless this middle term is itself 
definitional of the subject, it itself will be demonstrable, and hence 
kath’ hautos sumbebēkos, starting a regress that must terminate in 
atomic convertible predications.    Admittedly, how exactly that is 
thought to work is hard to see.  
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This sheds light on the theory of demonstration as laid 
out in Book 1.  Ferejohn has argued that there is a tension 
between the formal requirements of demonstration as laid 
out in 1.2 and in 1.5.57  For in 1.2, all that is required for a 
demonstration to qualify as a demonstration is that its 
premises be unmediated principles that are intrinsically 
intelligible and express the causes of the conclusion (71b20-
23).  In 1.5 we are told that there is epistēmē of a fact only if 
the demonstration that we have of that fact has a conclusion 
that is ‘universal’ in the sense delineated in 1.4 73b25-7,58 
according to which the predicate of a universal proposition 
must hold of its subject in every case and primitively and as 
such.59  Demonstrations that satisfy the first but not the 
                                                 
57 Ferejohn (2013, pp. 85-90, 123-31). 
58 This is a narrower sense of ‘universal’ (katholou) than that usually 
employed by Aristotle, according to which the term applies to any 
predication that holds “in every case” (see APr. 24a18), which is 
why Ferejohn (2013, p. 83) refers to such predications not as 
“universal” but as “catholic”. 
59 Aristotle here says that a predication that is katholou in this sense 
is kath’ hauto and hēi auto (insofar as it is itself).  The phrase kath’ 
hauto is ambiguous; it should be no surprise that I understand it 
here to refer to what is kath’ hauto 2, but other senses are possible.  
Aristotle himself unpacks what hēi auto means here: the predicate 
holds of a chance and primitive case of the subject.  The predicate 
not only follows the subject; it is that very subject, at its own level 
of specificity, that is responsible for the predicate.  Aristotle gives 
his usual example: isosceles is 2RA is not hēi auto; triangle is 2RA 
is.  In other words, subject and predicate convert.  On this see 
Angioni (2018, pp. 159-60, 179-81).  Aristotle revisits this 
requirement in 2.16, which again declares that in a properly 
expressed demonstration, major and minor terms will convert.  I 
take it that Aristotle is making this same point, that the kath’ hauta 
sumbebēkota convert with their subjects, at Meta. Δ 18 1022a35-6:  
“Kath’ hauta in yet another sense are all of those things which 
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second conditions are said to allow for epistēmē only in a 
sophistic sense (1.5 74a25-30).  For example, a 
demonstration that isosceles triangles have 2RA would fail 
to qualify as a true demonstration, for it is insofar as it is a 
triangle that the figure is 2RA.   
I have shown how to resolve the tension that arises in 
Ferejohn’s reading of Aristotle’s demonstrative theory.  If 
one can demonstrate that S is P, one will be able to define P 
as a certain feature present in (and thereby caused by) the 
subject S.  S will accordingly be predicated of P in its 
definition.60  That would mean that if one has a legitimate 
demonstration that isosceles triangles are 2RA, isosceles 
                                                 
belong to [a subject] along and on account of it alone, [regarded] 
in isolation,” but the text is too terse and obscure to be used as 
supporting evidence for my account. 
60 The point is well made by Bronstein (2016, p. 47): “Aristotle says 
that the middle term signifies the cause and thus part of the essence 
of eclipse. He makes the same claim about other demonstrable 
attributes: thunder (2.8, 93b7–14 . . .), which belongs to cloud; 
harmony (2.2, 90a18–23 . . .), which belongs to high and low notes; 
leaf-shedding (2.16, 98b33–8, 2.17, 99a21–9), which belongs to 
broad-leafed plant. We would call these processes or events, but it 
is characteristic of Aristotle’s thinking in the APo that he treats 
them as attributes of an underlying subject, just like 2R, which is 
an attribute of triangle. He indicates that the complete essence and 
definition of each of these attributes includes both the cause 
(signified by the middle term) and the subject to which the attribute 
belongs.  . . . Since each of these attributes belongs to a subject 
partly in terms of which it is defined, each belongs in itself2 to its 
subject. In addition, since each can be demonstrated to belong to 
its subject through a middle term that signifies part of the 
attribute’s essence, each is a demonstrable attribute of its subject.”  
I differ from Bronstein in taking all demonstrable attributes 
(including the non-twinkling of planets and so forth) to be of this 
kind. 
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would be present in the definition of 2RA.  But the feature 
of 2RA as present in scalene triangle is the same feature as is 
present in isosceles.  The two features do not have different 
definitions.  Because their ‘what is it’ is the same, their ‘why 
is it’ is the same.  It follows that the ‘demonstration’ that 
isosceles triangles are 2RA does not, as such, reveal the ‘why 
is it’ of 2RA.  This is why a definition of 2RA could be culled 
not from it61 but from the proof that triangles are 2RA.62 
The account I have given considerably tidies up 
Aristotle’s philosophy of science.  The kath’ hauta sumbebēkota 
(which include derivative subjects) are the same as the kath’ 
hauta 2 predicates.  In order to understand how this is so we 
need not import the distinction between metaphysical and 
linguistic predication and put it to a use to which Aristotle 
himself does not put it.  We are able to make good sense of 
                                                 
61 To be sure, it would not be hard to demonstrate that isosceles 
triangles are 2RA on the basis of the fact that it is isosceles: drop a 
perpendicular from the angle that is not equal to another, and from 
the other vertices construct parallels to that, and the proof is fairly 
straightforward.  One can prove that isosceles triangles are 2RA on 
this basis, or through an application of a proof like that of Euclid, 
Elements 1.17. If multiple constructions will allow for 
demonstrating the same theorem, then there will be multiple 
middle terms. Would that mean that there are multiple 
mathematical definitions of 2RA?  Perhaps, but this only shows the 
limits of Aristotle’s analysis of geometrical thinking, which does 
not appeal to the intuition of those spatial relations that makes 
possible alternative proofs through alternative constructions.  On 
this see Harari (2004, pp. 109-16). 
62 I grant that the notion of a scientific or mathematical definition 
of 2RA, apart from simply “having angles that sum to the sum of 
two right angles” seems weird.  But “having angles etc.” would be 
at best a pretheoretical account fixing the reference of the phrase 
without giving the cause.  That it makes sense to ask “Why are 
triangles 2RA?” but not “What, mathematically speaking, is 2RA?” 
is a matter of the pragmatics of discourse. 
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the doctrine of the commensurate universal, and to show 
how the long discussion of whether and how a definition can 
be demonstrated forms an integral part of Aristotle’s account 
of the logical structure of scientific explanation. 
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